


CHAPTER ONE

**Unanimity and Disagreement
Among Transpersonal Psychologists**



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There is a widespread notion among transpersonal psychologists that all schools of transpersonal psychology and philosophy, all forms of mysticism, all religions, and all esoteric traditions, if one were only to penetrate to a deep enough level, are essentially delivering the same message. This is made explicit in the titles of Schuon's (1984) *The Transcendent Unity of Religions* and Huxley's (1944) *The Perennial Philosophy*, and in the writings of such perennialists as philosophers Huston Smith (1976) and Walter Stace (1960), and psychologists Frances Vaughan (1989) and Ken Wilber (1977, 1980, 1983).

Is this unanimity veridical or just appearance? To be sure, there *does* seem to be substantial agreement on a number of themes among students of transpersonal and mystical experience. For example, most transpersonal psychologists would accept as tenable the majority of the following metaphysical and psychological assumptions, which to a large extent set them apart from other psychologists and philosophers (Huxley, 1944; Shapiro, 1989; Vaughan, 1989; Marcoulesco, 1987):

1. There exists an Absolute (however defined) which transcends time, space, "thing-ness," and all forms of dualism, ultimately transcending any conceptualization whatsoever.

1-a. The Absolute is mysterious and inexplicable by ordinary rational means (*mysterium tremendum et fascinans*).

1-b. Paradox, therefore, is the inevitable means of describing or symbolizing the ineffable; the mystic uses symbols, images, and poetic metaphors to convey the meaning and form of transpersonal experience to the extent

that this is possible.

1-c. On a somewhat intermediate level, there exist higher (Platonic/Pythagorean) forms or archetypes, which inform the material world we live in; these archetypes can be intuited in some transpersonal states.

2. Self-transcendence is not only a possibility but a desideratum, i.e., the individual ego is not the terminus of development.

2-a. There is posited a hierarchy of levels of consciousness, culminating in a stage in which union with the Absolute has been fully realized. Thereafter ensues a sense of Ultimate Belonging, since the Absolute is our true "Self."

2-b. Intermediate levels of consciousness (parapsychological, visionary) are generally held to exist, but are typically to be avoided as a subtle distraction from the true goal of mystical union.

2-c. Union with the Absolute is described as sublimely blissful, beyond the understanding of the lower mental and emotional faculties, as well as beyond time and space.

2-d. The enlightened individual is a wholly dispassionate (detached) and compassionate being, free of cravings and desires; in a word, the enlightened individual can be called "selfless."

3. Mysticism is the "art of arts," demanding not merely intellectual assent, but dedication of one's entire being. Although the Absolute draws the mystic towards union (through "grace"), generally arduous efforts, such as meditation, prayer, ritual, and related practices, are also required.¹

Corresponding ethical, axiological, and pragmatic directives derive from these assumptions. For example, in the moral sphere, moderation, selfless love, compassion, charity, and service are emphasized in most transpersonal traditions (Huxley, 1944; Firman & Vargiu, 1977).

Corollary epistemological claims derived from the transpersonal view are:

1. That mystical experiences are cross-culturally identical or very nearly so.

2. That mystics can "Transcend their own conceptual framework, as well as conditioned modes of knowing and being in general" (Rothberg, 1989, p. 5). The mystical experience is typically described as "unconditioned."

An existentialist, by way of contrast, would undoubtedly reject many of these assumptions, e.g., the existence of the Absolute and the importance of self-transcendence. Instead, self-determined choice in the face of an indifferent or hostile universe might be held to characterize the human condition.

Indeed, the majority of Western psychologists, even many of those concerned with adult development, tend to ignore or even denigrate the transpersonal view, although the situation has changed somewhat in the past decade (Commons, et al., 1984; Commons, et al., 1989). Compare, for example, the current mainstream approaches to creativity (Sternberg, 1988)

with those proposed by transpersonalists like Harman and Rheingold (1984), Gowan (1975, 1977), and Funk (1989).²

Areas of Disagreement

In point of fact, however, there have been some major disagreements among transpersonal psychologists. While some of these are of relatively recent vintage, many are enduring dilemmas of theology, philosophy, or comparative religion, which have been recirculating through this newly emergent field (Faivre, 1987; Marcoulesco, 1987; Dupre, 1987). For the most part, these areas of dispute have not received sufficient attention. Thus, the first purpose of this essay is to delineate a few of the more problematic areas of controversy. The second is to propose a highly schematic model of consciousness in the hope of clarifying the nature of some of these debates.

Below is a consideration of several disputed issues:

1. A number of postmodern thinkers (Katz, 1978; Gimello, 1983) have argued that the notion of some perennial cross-cultural transpersonal experience is invalid. Katz and his colleagues argue that since all experience is mediated or filtered by culture, language, tradition, and psychosocial "myths" (Keen, 1983), there can be no unmediated mystical experience. There is not and could not be a common core to transpersonal experience:

Buddhist mystical experiences . . . are in no sense the same as the Christian mystic's experience of the Trinity . . . or the Godhead; nor the same as the Jewish mystic's experience of *En-sof*; nor even the same as the Vedantist's experience of the identity of *atman* and *brahman*. (Gimello, 1983, p. 63)

It is widely accepted by social scientists that our everyday "reality" is socially constructed (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). The question for transpersonal psychology is whether, on the developmental ascent through the "thickets" of culture there is some sort of "timberline" above which culture has no, or at least no relevant, influence.

A pivotal study by Brown (1986) may shed light on this issue. Brown intensively examined the stages along three Eastern meditative paths and concluded that the Buddhist and Hindu (Yogic) traditions, although positing essentially an identical sequence of steps in the deconstruction of the structures of ordinary consciousness during meditation, *actually experience the stages differently*, the Hindu tradition emphasizing continuity, the Buddhists discontinuity.³ Thus Brown reaches a conclusion: .

Nearly the opposite of that of the stereotyped notion of the perennial philosophy according to which many spiritual paths are said to lead to the

same end. . . . [W]e have to conclude . . . : *there is only one path, but it has several outcomes*. There are several kinds of enlightenment, although all free awareness from psychological structure and alleviate suffering. . . . While all . . . the kinds of enlightenment are valid, each represents a different point of view. (pp. 266–7)

Thus even the highest, nondualistic stages of enlightenment may be influenced by implicit cultural themata.⁴ Pragmatically, however, the differences do not seem nearly as crucial as Katz (1978) and the relativists would have it. Rothberg (1989), in a cogent philosophical refutation of the extreme relativist position, makes slight concessions to the relativists but concludes:

[Brown] holds that there is in all three traditions an initial “enlightenment” experience, understood as a transcendence of all constructed states of consciousness. . . . Paradoxically, each path of deconstruction or deconditioning is itself constructed or conditioned in a certain way. . . . [It is] thus correct to suggest that the experiences of mystics are almost always in part constructed or mediated, but . . . there are experiences in which all or certain forms of construction and mediation are not present. (p. 13)

The relativist/perennialist controversy has endured for millennia and is far from resolved, but the postmodern stance of extreme relativism seems increasingly inadequate in the light of the findings of transpersonal psychology.

There are other accounts of differences among transpersonalists. Shapiro (1989) has analyzed the implicit and explicit assumptions held by transpersonal scholars and demonstrated that there exist at least five important areas of divergence of belief. These focus on:

- the nature of reality (benign or not),
- the role of evil (existence addressed or not),
- the orientation to the spiritual (theistic or nontheistic),
- the significance of human will (effort or grace), and
- the choice of spiritual path (universal or particular).

Using Shapiro’s dimensions, one could theoretically articulate up to 32 distinct transpersonal philosophies!

2. Even among the perennialists, however, there is general acknowledgment that not all transpersonal states are equal. On a somewhat obvious level, Stace (1960) distinguishes extravertive from introvertive mysticism. The former, lower state of consciousness remains in contact with the environment; the latter, higher state transcends it (Gowan, 1975). Going farther, Wilber (1983) has distinguished four levels of mysticism: the *panenhenic* (nature mysticism; extravertive sense of all-in-Oneness), the *theistic* (visionary approach to Absolute), the *monistic* (experience of union

with and as the Absolute), and the *nondualistic* (union of the Absolute with the relative). These differ, though, only in distance traveled along essentially the same transcendental path. Wilber's transpersonal stages are usually, but not necessarily, experienced in sequence: A mystic can experience theistic states without necessarily passing through the panenhenic stage, for example (Wilber, 1983).

Farther still, Gowan (1975), summarizing the results of previous research with a special reliance on classic Buddhist cartographies, has distinguished a continuum of over a dozen transpersonal states. His finely tuned distinctions include, for example, sensing the presence of the Absolute, hearing the Absolute, seeing the Absolute, "touching" the Absolute, penetrating the Absolute, merging with the Absolute, and so on. Brown (1986) offers a somewhat comparable 18-step model of the stages of Buddhist and Yogic meditation.

The appropriate placement of any particular transpersonal state is, however, subject to debate. Gowan (1975), for example, notes some minor disagreement over whether nature mysticism should be considered as a truly ecstatic (nonordinary) state of consciousness. More crucially, there has recently been a flurry of articles on the appropriate interpretation of shamanic and near-death experiences (NDE's), which Ring (1989), among others, sees as formally identical. Wilber (1981, 1983) and Vaughan (1989) view shamanism and even theistic visionary states as transpersonal but as *lesser* than true, nondual mystical experience, in that visionary states remain subtly dualistic. That is, the self remains somewhat apart from the Absolute. Furthermore, experiences imbued with some sort of "sensory" content, however transcendent, are nevertheless treated as inferior to those states of "pure consciousness" which transcend such content. Similarly, Walsh (1989a, b), by careful phenomenological analysis, has discriminated between the shamanic and other altered or mystical states of consciousness.

Gowan (1975), however, while acknowledging the presence of the "numinous" in shamanism, feels that shamanic trance is largely *prepersonal*—"parataxic" in his terminology—in that ego, memory, and volition are largely deficient or even absent. Peters (1989) and Walsh (1989a, b), notwithstanding, provide solid evidence that volition is indeed (often) present in shamanic soul traveling and healing. Peters, in fact, holds the position, contrary to most others, that at some level, "The different spiritual methods represent different practices to achieve the same state of unity consciousness" (p. 130). Peters is aware of the apparent differences between Eastern mysticism and shamanism, but feels that the similarities (identities?) are compelling. For example, both Vipassana meditation masters and Apache shamans produce the same "integrative" teaching style on Rorschach protocols (Peters, 1989). Generally, those transpersonalists with anthropological or parapsychological leanings have a more favorable

interpretation of shamanism and related states, while those aligned with meditative traditions and the purification of consciousness are more critical.

3. A third major issue is one which, although well known to students of comparative religion (Faivre, 1987), does not appear to have surfaced in the recent literature of transpersonal psychology. This is the contrast between *mysticism* and *esotericism*. The latter term might best be understood initially by way of some illustrations. The Gurdjieff method (Ouspensky, 1949), for instance, appears to be rather different in purpose from the meditative or contemplative traditions, be they Hindu, Buddhist, or Christian. Concepts like "self-remembering" and establishing a "permanent 'I'" at the very least *sound* quite different from self-transcendence and the Buddhist *sunyata* (void), an experience of emptiness meant to "crush the belief in concrete existence" (Guenther, cited in Epstein, 1989, p. 64). Some of the apparent contradiction may be due to linguistic confusion, occasioned by imprecise use of terms like "ego" and "self," but actual differences may indeed remain. Wilson (1986) concluded his critique of the Gurdjieff system by stating that it is "[n]ot a way of meditation, or of mysticism, or of physical self-discipline. This is primarily a way of knowledge, a way that depends on knowing *certain definite things*" (p. 47).

Similarly, Rudolph Steiner parted company from Eastern mysticism. He labeled his school Anthroposophy, in contrast to Eastern influenced Theosophy, to emphasize that, "Whereas formerly the divine wisdom was imparted by the divine world itself to man, now man himself by divine grace, must transmute his earth-born thinking to the higher level of divine wisdom, by the true understanding of himself" (Shepherd, 1954, p. 73). McDermott (1989), a student of Anthroposophy, makes the radical claim that mysticism is only the *penultimate* state of development, whereas "higher cognition" is the ultimate state. Taking an evolutionary approach, McDermott argues that mysticism was more appropriate to an earlier historical era, when the (Western) egoic mode of consciousness was less developed.

Esotericism, then, refers to a special interior or intuitive knowledge of hidden relationships between humanity, the cosmos, and the Absolute. Esotericism sounds quite similar to mysticism, but Faivre (1987) sees the latter as more "feminine," involving renunciation and absorption into a larger unity. Esotericism, in contrast, is

more "masculine," more solar, cultivates detachment and is more attentive to structures. In his own journey, the mystic discovers the same intermediate entities. . . . But while the [esotericist] views such entities [McDermott's higher cognitions] as a source of enlightening . . . knowledge, the mystic limits their numbers as much as he can and aspires to pass beyond them and be united directly with his God. (p. 158)

If, as Wilber (1981), Gebser (1986), and other historians of consciousness have testified, humanity has indeed evolved fairly recently—since roughly 500 B.C. in the West—to a “solar” egoic stage of awareness, then the more active, intellectual transpersonalism of Gurdjieff, Steiner, and even Jung (1964) might well be considered an equally or more appropriate path for our own age. Perennialists would undoubtedly disagree and so the mysticism-esotericism issue remains another source of contention.

4. In a chapter dedicated to emphasizing the distinctions between his own model of transpersonal development and Wilber’s, Washburn (1988) discusses a number of points of controversy. One revolves around the contrast between Wilber’s linear model of growth and Washburn’s more spiral model. Washburn claims that in the process of ascending to transpersonal stages, one has to first descend to work through repressed prepersonal material, a process he terms “regression in the service of transcendence.” Interestingly, Fowler’s (1981) analysis of faith development follows an analogous spiralling path, in which earlier issues need to be reassimilated as one approaches a new stage.

Another source of contention is whether the prepersonal and transpersonal realms are similar or not. Wilber (1980) argues that the similarities are merely superficial (both are nonpersonal and nonrational in nature), but formally the two realms are different, even antithetical. Washburn (1988), on the other hand, maintains that the similarities are not merely accidental; prepersonal and transpersonal are both aspects of what he terms the *Dynamic Ground*.

Perhaps the major point of opposition, though, is over the question of the ultimate ontological significance of the “self.” Does the self continue to exist in states of transpersonal integration or is it ultimately seen as illusory? Wilber, aligned with the Eastern traditions, treats the ego as illusory, a transition structure based on a false identification. In contrast, Washburn, like Jung (1964), posits two “selves,” a lower one (the mundane ego), and a higher Self, which, in ideal development, eventually assumes dominance over the ego. Neither self, however, is dispensed with. Instead, according to Washburn (1988), “[v]iewing the egoic self as a real but pseudo-independent self, prescribes a transcendence that would reunite and ‘alchemically’ bond the egoic self with its missing superior half” (p. 39). The choice, then, is between two selves or none.⁵

To a great extent, this last controversy overlaps the mysticism-esotericism debate mentioned above. Note the reference to the esoteric tradition of alchemy! Like the esotericists and unlike the mystics, Washburn wishes to transform and realign but not dispense with the self.

5. Campbell’s (1976) phenomenology of the higher stages of consciousness, derived from the Vedic tradition via Maharishi Mahesh Yogi (see also Alexander, Chapter 2 this volume) seems rather different from

Wilber's (1980), the former system apparently omitting or de-emphasizing the visionary/theistic level, emphasizing "pure consciousness"—probably Wilber's monistic level—from the outset.

6. The precise relationship between personal self-actualization and transpersonal self-transcendence has also been at issue. Those holding a roughly linear model of development, like Maslow (1970) and Wilber (1980), view self-transcendence as more or less a natural outgrowth of self-actualization. Russell's (1986) topography, in contrast, conceptualizes self-actualization and self-transcendence as essentially distinct, even orthogonally related phenomena. One can grow personally (via psychotherapy) by making unconscious material conscious; or one can develop transpersonally (by meditation) by accessing higher states of consciousness. The two paths *may* be mutually facilitative, but remain separate nevertheless.

The proponents of psychosynthesis (Firman & Vargiu, 1977) promote "self-realization," which entails *both* actualization and transcendence, visualized as orthogonal to each other, in a subtle balance. Keen's (1983) highest developmental stage, the "lover," is similarly dialectically poised between the personal and the transpersonal.

A Three-Factor Model of Consciousness

Below, an admittedly sketchy and rather speculative "model" is proposed, which, because it is multifactorial, might shed some light on the problems presented above. It is an attempt to formulate a notational system, a sort of shorthand, capable of encoding the diversity of schools, languages, and traditions. The various components of the model are not new; all have been derived or adapted from previous transpersonal writers, most notably Gowan (1975), Washburn (1988), M. Epstein (1988), and Wilber (1980, 1986a, b). They have not, however, heretofore been synthesized into a single framework. Before presenting the model, though, it behooves the author to explain why existing models, despite their brilliance and comprehensiveness, have proven problematic.

The difficulty with linear, unidimensional models like Wilber's (1980) has just been discussed (see also Washburn, 1988). Gowan (1975) has proposed a two-factor model: the essential element in all nonordinary experience he calls, following theologian Rudolf Otto, *contact with the numinous*. The other factor is the level of ego development. Gowan's scheme entails essentially three basic levels of ego functioning, with numerous subdivisions. These three levels he calls, borrowing again from Harry Stack Sullivan, prototaxic, parataxic, and syntaxic: non-egoic/body-oriented, quasi-egoic/iconic, and egoic/symbolic respectively. Gowan's finely tuned cartography of the syntaxic (transpersonal) stages has

already been noted. It is not clear, however, whether all the variability of these higher states is due entirely to changes in ego functioning, or whether there is such a thing as variability in the depth of penetration into the numinous. It appears as though only one factor varies, which again limits the model.⁶

Washburn's (1988) model is also bifactorial or bipolar, but here both ego and numinous, or in his terminology, the Dynamic Ground, are variable. The ego levels correspond crudely to the levels demarcated by Cook-Greuter (1990; this volume) and others,⁷ but the Ground is also divided into prepersonal (libido, instinct), personal (psychic energy), and transpersonal (Spirit) manifestations. The Ground for Washburn functions as a "nonspecific amplifier" (p. 111) that energizes all psychic systems, but which is not itself "reducible to or exclusively expressive of any particular system or systems" (p. 111). With his bipolar model, Washburn claims to have dealt with developmental issues, such as the death/rebirth process in midlife, in a more subtle way than Wilber, as noted above.⁸

The notion of contact with the Dynamic Ground (or numinous) is a prerequisite for any transpersonal model, but terms like "ego" are too oversimplified and/or confused as ordinarily presented. Precisely what is transcended in ego-transcendence? How does "ego loss" in schizophrenia differ, if at all, from "ego loss" in mysticism? It proved more productive to divide the ego's functions into two "systems," or groups of functions, thus yielding a three-factor theory. Each of these three factors can in turn be divided into at least two or more subfactors, in effect yielding a complex multifactorial schema. However, it is unlikely that these factors are causally independent. Some of the interrelationships between factors are sketched below.⁹

M. Epstein (1988), synthesizing findings from psychoanalysis and object-relations theory, differentiates two principal components of the ego system. This distinction became necessary to resolve some of the confusion engendered when Western transpersonalists tried to comprehend Eastern concepts like "egolessness."

The tendency of contemporary theorists has been to propose developmental schema in which meditation systems develop "beyond the ego". . . , yet this approach has ignored aspects of the ego which are not abandoned and which are, in fact, developed through meditation practice itself. (M. Epstein, 1988, p. 61)

The two major components of the ego are the *functional*—concerned with reality testing, mediation between inner and outer, and synthesis or integration, and the *representational*—concerned with the formation of self and object representations, and also the source of the sense of "I" that is

normally felt. These two components, in a somewhat adapted form, will here be called *ego as process (EPro)* and *ego as representation-individualization (ERep)*, respectively. It is important to note that the functions of EPro refer only to dynamic capabilities possessed by the ego, but without any notion of I-hood, or a separate self-sense implied. This parallels Wilber's (1986a) distinction between basic structures, devoid of "self," and transitional, phase-specific stages of the self per se. ERep, in contrast, refers to the ego's relatively solidified sense of itself as a separate self/agent, and to its reflected image of itself.

These two subfunctions of the ERep require further elaboration. A century ago, William James (1890/1950) divided these two aspects of the self into the "I" and the "me" and that distinction will be employed here. As De Martino (1963) has so carefully observed:

Human existence is . . . ego-conscious existence. . . . Ego-consciousness means an ego aware or conscious of itself. Awareness of itself is expressed as affirmation of itself, the "I." . . . Affirmation of itself also entails, however, a bifurcation of itself. . . . As affirmer it performs the act of affirming itself. As affirmed it is an existential fact presented to itself. . . . The ego as subject-affirmer is not chronologically prior to itself as object-affirmed. Nor does its individuation precede its bifurcation. . . . This is the initial situation of man . . . , which may be characterized as contingent or conditioned subjectivity. (pp. 142-3)

The fundamental sense of being a separate self, possessing continuity, distinctness, and agency, De Martino's affirming-subject, James's "I," will be referred to as *ERep-I*. One's reflected image of one's physical, behavioral, interpersonal, and psychological functioning, the affirmed object, James's "me," will be referred to as *ERep-M*. Contrary to the popularly held notion, "the 'I' is not identical with the ego, but is more precisely a component" (M. Epstein 1988, p. 64). Although Epstein (1988) includes the defensive function of the ego, so diligently elaborated by the Freuds and their followers (Freud, 1936/1966), within the functional rubric (i.e., EPro), here the defenses will be subsumed under ERep-M, because it is largely this image that is being defended.¹⁰ Wilber (1986a) also locates the defenses in the self (representational) system.

Along with a sense of I and an image of me, people also have a corresponding sense and image of others and of the world, the "objects" of object-relations theory. In De Martino's (1963) words, "Affirmation of itself involves the individuation of itself, the ego . . . discriminated from that which is not itself— . . . 'not-I'" (p. 143). Generally, in this paper, the focus will be on changes *within* the person, the inevitable corresponding changes in relation to world and objects remaining implicit.

M. Epstein (1988) explicitly states that in the course of Vipassana

meditation, and presumably other forms of transpersonal development, it is the *representational* component of the ego (ERep) that is deconstructed, while the *functional* component, particularly the synthesizing capability (an aspect of EPro), is actually *strengthened*. Meditation does not lead “beyond ego” (such that the faculties of EPro are somehow eliminated), but rather effects change within the ego (discussed more fully below).

In M. Epstein’s (1988) usage, the functional component of the ego refers primarily to short-term dynamic processes. At the risk of theoretical fuzziness, EPro will be broadened to include long-term stages of ego development as well (Cook-Greuter, 1990), since most theories of adult development adopt a stage orientation (Commons et al., 1984). A structure such as a developmental stage will therefore be interpreted as process or function slowed down and generalized.¹¹

EPro can also be subdivided. It seems fruitful to differentiate first-level ego processes per se, the sorts of capabilities and awarenesses described on the process level by M. Epstein (1988), and structurally by Cook-Greuter (1990), from *meta-awareness* of one’s thought processes, such as occur in Vipassana (insight) meditation. The insight meditator “witnesses” the very structures—thoughts, images, feelings, perceptions, fantasies—through which one normally constructs the world (Kornfield, 1989).

Insight practices operate within the ego system itself. Attending to both the subjective intimation of the experiencing I *and* to the abstract cognitions that form it on a conceptual level, insight practices seek to uncover the elementary particles of the “I” experience. (M. Epstein, 1988, p. 65)

Cook-Greuter (1990) maintains that at postformal levels, past stage 4 and especially at stage 5/6 in her scheme, the person spontaneously begins to see through cultural norms, linguistic conditioning, and related structures, but that this awareness is not identical to what occurs in meditation. Rational, mediated “thinking about” one’s self and culture is a different process from intuitive, unmediated awareness of the “elementary particles of the ‘I’ experience.” Therefore, the model treats these processes as distinct: EPro will be used for regular ego processes and stages, and *EPro*, for the special case of trained meta-awareness of one’s own ego processes. One caveat: *EPro* probably will emerge to some extent, indeed may be somewhat constitutive of Cook-Greuter’s stage 6, the universal stage.¹²

In fact, the universal stage presents something of an anomaly, in that by this level of development, the egoic posture has to some extent been surrendered. Paradoxically, the more developed the ego, the greater the likelihood of the person adopting a universal perspective and experiencing a sense of interconnectedness. A number of transegoic capacities begin to

emerge at stage 6, variously called intuition, prajna, insight, unitary concepts, illumination, etc. (Wilber, 1980). In effect, the boundary between ego and the numinous has become porous (Wilber, 1977).¹³

Combining Washburn (1988) and Gowan (1975), contact with the numinous or Dynamic Ground (hereafter *CN*) can be subdivided into, minimally, five levels:

- CN-lib—the libidinal (or lower), instinctual, prepersonal aspect of the Ground;
- CN-pers—the psychological or personal aspect, manifested, for example, in “charismatic” individuals (Washburn) or in creative activity (Gowan);
- CN-nat—the extraverted (nature-oriented) transpersonal aspect;
- CN-arch—the archetypal, visionary transpersonal aspect; and
- CN-spir—the spiritual, (monistic, nondualistic) transpersonal aspect.

Finer subdivisions of the transpersonal are of course possible (Gowan, 1975, Wilber, 1980), but three levels seems a reasonable compromise between the competing demands of precision and parsimony. The degree of intensity of *CN* is also assumed to vary.

Finally, it seems essential to divide contact with the numinous not only into developmental levels, but, following Grof (1980), into aspects of the numinous that seem located in ordinary reality, and those—henceforth called *CN** to indicate their unusual nature—located in some apparently “non-ordinary” reality, as are many near-death experiences (NDE’s) (Ring, 1984) and shamanic experience (Peters, 1989; Walsh 1989a, b).¹⁴

Interactions of the Three Factors

The various factors delineated are undoubtedly not independent. As illustrated in Figure 1.1, they typically interact in specifiable ways, notably:

a. Typically, as *ERep* decreases and/or *EPro* increases, *CN* also spontaneously increases. That is, the numinous is presumed to be ever-present but veiled by the defenses and distortions of *ERep* and/or undetected by inadequately developed *EPro*. Sufficiently high ego development (Maslow, 1971; Cook-Greuter, 1990) in and of itself often leads to greater *CN*. *ERep* is posited by many traditions, especially Buddhism, to be ultimately illusory—no matter how congruent in Rogers’s (1961) sense—so that *ERep* diminishes as *CN* increases. As *EPro* evolves through **EPro**, *ERep* decreases and may vanish entirely as a factor in the enlightened state.¹⁵

b. *ERep-M* and *EPro* tend to have a seesaw effect. Many traditions argue that we have overinvested in self-image, i.e., *ERep-M*, at the expense of *EPro*, and that meditation, therapy, self-remembering, etc., can serve to redress this imbalance. As defenses yield, one becomes more “realistic,”




Figure 1.1. Interplay among CN, ERep-I, ERep-M, EPro, and Ego Stage

i.e., ego as process (EPro) actually begins to improve. As noted above, M. Epstein (1988) is careful to point out that what is transcended in ego-transcendence is ERep, not EPro.

Beyond a certain point, ERep-M and ERep-I also tend to have a seesaw effect. Overinvestment in ERep-M can begin to weaken one's actual sense of individuality and agency (ERep-I). This can be seen clearly in some of the personality disorders (schizoid, narcissistic) discussed below.

Sometimes ERep and EPro can both be fairly strong, which leads to the sort of paradox Barron (1969) observed when studying very creative people, namely, the simultaneous coexistence of competence and ego-strength (EPro) alongside neurotic and even psychotic tendencies (ERep; the model assumes that such defenses are part of a highly developed ERep-M system).

c. ERep-M, especially the defenses, can repress CN. The psychoanalysts (Freud, 1936/1966) discovered this when exploring the lower level (CN-lib), Reich (1976; Baker, 1980) extended this principle to the middle level of ordinary personality functioning (CN-pers) with his notions of character rigidity and contactlessness, and Jung (1964) and Maslow (1971) found the same process at work on the higher (CN-nat, -arch, -spir) levels. Maslow called the repression of one's higher nature the Jonah complex, Wilber (1980), "repression of the emergent unconscious." ERep-M can also usurp the energy and power of the numinous for its own ignoble ends, a phenomenon Jung (Rosenthal, 1987) named ego inflation (discussed below).

d. ERep-M, especially the defenses, can also inhibit development of EPro (see b above). In other words, a strongly defended, fearful representational ego may not allow higher levels of consciousness/cognition to emerge. The paranoid is extremely unlikely to reach postformal stages.

e. EPro, in turn, will influence the complexity of ERep, especially ERep-M, as well as affect one's appreciation of CN. Obviously, one's self-concept depends on one's overall cognitive capacity (Harter, 1983). As for CN, Wilber (1983), for one, has described what happens when an adult "fixated" at a prepersonal level ("mythical") undergoes a transpersonal experience; typically it only reinforces this undeveloped mode of reality apperception. CN is assimilated into a network of prerational ideation. (But see g below.)

f. As Armstrong's (1985) study of transpersonal experiences in childhood makes clear, even those at low levels of EPro can sometimes experience the higher levels of CN in a profound way. The transpersonal aspect of the numinous can theoretically be experienced from any ego state, although, as we have seen, certain conditions (very advanced EPro/*EPro*) are more conducive. Childhood, though, typically has the advantage of a rather undeveloped ERep-M (see c above).

g. CN can greatly affect ERep and probably EPro as well. Maslow

wrote of neuroses that cleared up after a single profound peak experience (CN-nat, -arch, -spir), and studies of near-death experience (presumably CN-arch) indicate vast changes in personality, values, and world view in the majority of experiencers (Ring, 1984).

Given this preliminary treatment of the three (or more) factors, the model can now be used to examine the different stages, states, paths, and therapies specified by various personal and transpersonal writers and schools.

Applications of the Three-Factor Model

1. Normal States

The discussion below and Tables 1.1 through 1.3 depict the main features and directions of various states of development and paths of change. The author's familiarity with many of these states and paths is second hand, so the tables and their elaboration must remain tentative.

What would "normality" consist of in this model? ERep-M manifests rather prominently, providing fertile ground for much "standard" psychology. In the reasonably "healthy" person this self-concept is positive—probably, as Lewinsohn et al. (1980) have observed, somewhat illusorily so—and reasonably congruent with who one is organismically in Rogerian terminology (Rogers, 1961). ERep-I is, at least in the West over the past several centuries, sharply articulated, possessed of a strong sense of agency, uniqueness, and continuity (Keen, 1983; Wilber, 1981). EPro will vary, most normal people in industrialized countries reaching abstract or formal operations (Cook-Greuter's stages 3/4 and 4), with a much smaller percentage entering the postformal realms (4/5 or 5, and very rarely 5/6 or 6). *EPro* is likely to be weak, however, except in those who have undergone certain types of therapy, who meditate, or who have on their own reached stage 6. CN is limited to CN-lib/pers and in any event is typically fairly minimal in the majority. Washburn (1988) explains how and why the average person inevitably represses the Dynamic Ground from early childhood onward. In normalcy, the numinous is typically approached sporadically, if at all, through sex, nature, certain types of music (Funk, 1989), childbirth, falling in love, creative activity, and moments of great accomplishment (Maslow, 1971). Note the somewhat "extraverted" flavor of these peak experiences (CN-nat at best). In sum, as Tart (1987) and Ouspensky (1949) among many others have noted, the combination of strongly filtered experience (due to ERep), moderate EPro, and weakly cultivated *EPro* and CN produce a "normal" state more accurately viewed as "waking sleep" or cultural hypnosis. Only in fleeting peak moments is the person truly "awake" (Tart, 1987).

Table 1.1
Application of the Three-Factor Model to Normal and Pathological States

State	ERep-M	ERep-I	EPro	CN
Normalcy	prominent, mildly positive and congruent, but "normally" illusory	moderately strong	stage: mostly 4 or lower, rarely higher; processes: adequate	minimal, limited to CN-lib and CN-pers
Nonpeaking self-actualizer	more positive and congruent	strong, active	stage: 5 or 5/6; processes: awareness of cultural and linguistic conditioning, beginning *EPro*?	strong, but limited to CN-lib and CN-pers
Neurosis	very prominent, defensive; overly negative or idealized; incongruent	weak	variable; if high may be creative	repressed on all levels
Schizoid	dominates entire life; fantasy; highly incongruent	very tenuous	may be high, but more typically reality testing, etc., weakened	extremely repressed; sense of unreality or "shut-upness"
Schizophrenia	confused, fragmented; very negative or grandiose	extremely weak or absent; "ego loss"	more intact in paranoids, but generally processes regress	debatable: CN-lib likely; sometimes CN-arch may occur

The highest stage of personal development, but which lacks the transpersonal dimension, would be what Maslow called the nonpeaking self-actualizer, or in Cook-Greuter's (1990) system stage 5 (or 5/6). These stages are postformal, but not yet unitary. From descriptions by Maslow (1970) and others, EPro will be higher than normal, some incipient sense of *EPro* might be dawning, and ERep-M will be highly congruent and positive. Although CN-nat, CN-arch, CN-spir are minimal or absent in the nonpeaker, CN-lib/pers may be strongly present, serving as an "energizing" background in daily activity (Washburn, 1988).

2. Pathological States

Neurosis is simply a more problematic version of normality (Becker, 1973). ERep-M is strongly present, but is either overly negative and/or incongruent, or overly idealized (Horney, 1950). As Keen (1983) noted, "The neurotic has a godlike, idealized image of the self and a wormlike, degraded image of the self, but very little sense of real limits, abilities, or power" (p. 225). ERep-I is most likely somewhat weaker (i.e., less solid, more anxiety-ridden) than in normality, in that the sense of agency (in obsessions) or continuity (in dissociative disorders) is more tenuous. EPro is highly variable; if high, the person may be fairly creative, despite neurotic motivation (Barron, 1969; Storr, 1972). More usually EPro will be low to moderate. CN, even CN-lib, will probably be weaker due to the greater defensiveness and rigidity present.

The schizoid personality (Laing, 1965) can be viewed as transitional between neurosis and psychosis. In this disorder investment in ERep-M is extremely high; in a sense, the schizoid lives almost entirely in a symbolic world, but one which does not correspond well to the conventional one (Becker, 1973). Defenses such as fantasy, withdrawal, idealization, and splitting predominate in the schizoid and related personality disorders (e.g., borderline, narcissistic). ERep-I is highly tenuous; as Laing (1965) has noted, the schizoid's outward behavior reflects a conforming "false self," while the hidden, protected "true self" rarely engages others or the world. EPro, in some cases, may be high—Storr (1972) cites Einstein as an example—but is probably as often low to moderate. Despite the schizoid's claims, true self-insight (either stage 5/6 EPro or stage 6 *EPro*) is not likely. Extreme defensiveness is prone to inhibit development of ego as process. CN is probably at its absolute lowest in the schizoid, who typically feels trapped in a condition of "shut-upness" (Kierkegaard's phrase, cited in Laing, 1965) and drained of "realness." Even the normal's sense of libidinal embodiment (CN-lib), which gives a certain degree of zest and energy to everyday living, is highly attenuated if not absent in the disembodied schizoid disorder.

If the schizoid position cannot be maintained, the next “logical step” is schizophrenia (Laing, 1965). The schizophrenic’s ERep-M is often highly negative and/or confused, although magical, delusional attempts at restitution (grandiosity) are fairly common. ERep-I is at its absolute lowest; the schizophrenics (or severe depressives) not uncommonly claim they have died. EPro may not change at first, especially in paranoid schizophrenics, although prolonged schizophrenia tends to be regressive.¹⁶ The loss of the abstract attitude noted by Goldstein (1964) and the lack of logical ability to organize parts into whole systems (Angyal, 1964) can be cited as examples.

One of the most controversial issues surrounding schizophrenia is whether CN exists, and if so, of what order. The conventional view is that either CN does not occur, or that perhaps aspects of CN-lib, grossly misinterpreted, may be experienced. On the other hand, transpersonalists like Laing (1979), Lukoff (1985), Perry (1974), and Van Dusen (1979), based on clinical studies of archetypal and related experience in psychosis, maintain that in some cases CN-nat/arch does indeed occur, although often muddled with ego fragments (ERep-M/I).

3. Transpersonal States

In extraverted or nature mysticism, the lowest transpersonal stage (Wilber, 1983), ERep-M/I remains, although attention is focused outward away from the self. In fact, one nature mystic described this experience as that of “having no head” (Harding, 1963). That is, one’s sense of separateness and self-consciousness is quite minimized, ERep-M perhaps even temporarily suspended. However, ERep-I does not entirely disappear in these beginning transpersonal stages. Wilber (1977) illustrates this by diagramming the boundary between organism and environment with a dashed rather than a solid line. EPro remains as developed as before and will probably be enhanced (*EPro*), at least transiently. Someone embedded at stages 5 or 5/6 might permanently advance to stage 6 after such an experience. CN is now tangibly present, but at the low end of the transpersonal spectrum, CN-nat (Gowan, 1975). Since ERep is still present, the experience is usually not of all-consuming intensity either. Again, this may vary; in the case of Walt Whitman, quite powerful CN-nat, or even CN-arch/spir was, perhaps, an ingredient in his nature mysticism and poetry (Bucke, 1901/1969).

Visionary, archetypal, shamanic, and near-death states still retain vestiges of subtle dualism. ERep-M and ERep-I remain, although ERep-M may now seem superfluous and the boundaries of ERep-I may become highly permeable and fluid. One is still an individual, but *who* one is has altered (Tart, 1975). The fate of EPro is less definite. Certain functions, useful in ordinary experience, may be temporarily lost or suspended; others

Table 1.2
Application of the Three-Factor Model to Transpersonal States

State	ERep-M	ERep-I	EPro	CN
Peak experience (Extraverted mysticism)	weak, may be temporarily suspended	dimly present	probably enhanced, possibly to *EPro*; possible advancement to state 6	CN-nat usually, but may involve higher levels of CN
Visionary experience	superfluous, if present at all	permeable, fluid, but still subtly present	some lower functions may be temporarily suspended; *EPro*; higher processes, unitary concepts, etc.	CN-arch, often intense; possibly permanent CN as a result; CN* explorations often claimed
Inflation	similar to visionary experience except that CN-arch is usurped by ERep-M			
Theistic mysticism	similar to visionary experience except CN more likely to be at upper regions of CN-arch or beginnings of CN-spir; insight may occur spontaneously			
Enlightenment	nonexistent, or seen as illusory; both ERep-M and ERep-I deconstructed		*EPro* at its most advanced; strong synthesizing capacity	CN-spir; CN* unclear—more likely in esoteric than in meditative traditions
Salvation	remains; being member of spiritual elite part of self-concept; projection used as defense	unchanged	stage: typically not high, 4 or lower; processes: rigid, dualistic, absolutistic	may occur; if present, usually CN-lib, alone or mixed with higher levels; meaning of CN distorted

may be enhanced (Tart, 1975). On the other hand, during an NDE, EPro may be temporarily enhanced to *EPro* as a result of the sudden, intense CN-arch. Furthermore, the long-term aftereffects of an NDE on a previously "normal" person can be dramatic, with modifications in ERep-M, ERep-I, and probably EPro. Permanently enhanced CN may even result (Ring, 1984).

Kornfield (1989) describes what can happen if CN is contaminated by ERep-M. The resulting usurpation of the powers of the numinous by the ego is called "inflation" by Jungians (Rosenthal, 1987) or "corruptions of insight" in Buddhism (Kornfield, 1989). In a sense, inflation may be seen as a pathological variant of the visionary states described above.¹⁷ Because of the risk of inflation by the still (if subtly) present ERep, virtually all traditions caution students to avoid attachment to visions, insights, psychic powers, and so forth. Instead, they are encouraged to press on with meditation until ERep has decreased in potency.

Theistic mysticism presents a pattern similar to that of the visionary, except that ERep becomes increasingly weaker as one becomes more and more unified with the Absolute (Wilber, 1980), EPro progressively more likely to advance to *EPro* (Stage 6), and CN more likely to be at the higher levels of CN-arch or even the lower levels of CN-spir (Gowan, 1975). *EPro* may occur spontaneously, as one's separate self (ERep) is seen as increasingly unimportant and illusory. Autonomy yields to "theonomy" (Keen, 1983).

Finally, complete nondual enlightenment would look as follows: ERep-M would either no longer exist, or, if that is not possible, would be seen (via *EPro*) as so illusory that it no longer held any potency. One would no longer be "attached" to the ego and its cravings, in Buddhist terminology (Kornfield, 1989). ERep-I, the sense of oneself as separate, would have been deconstructed along with other unnecessary concepts about one's socially constructed "reality" (Brown, 1986).¹⁸ The Buddhist axioms of *anatta* and *anicca* (impermanence of self and external objects, respectively) speak definitively to this point.

Although the representative component of the ego has been eliminated or at least drastically reduced, the necessary egoic functions are still operative (Epstein, 1988). In fact, EPro is presumably at its maximum (*EPro*):

Advanced stages of insight meditation involve profound experiences of dissolution and fragmentation, yet the practitioner . . . is able to withstand these psychic pressures. It is the ego, primarily through its synthetic function, that permits integration of the experience of disintegration. In true egolessness, there could be only disintegration, and such a state would manifest as psychosis. (Epstein, 1988, p. 67)

With ERep eliminated, the person is integrated with the numinous or Absolute (CN-spir).¹⁹ The issue of CN* is less than clear. CN* seems to be ignored or deemed irrelevant in the quest for enlightenment, being more emphasized in esoteric traditions (Faivre, 1987). If CN* and ensuing “higher cognition” (McDermott, 1989) are absent in mystical but not in esoteric states, McDermott’s previously noted contention that “mysticism should be seen as the penultimate rather than the ultimate . . . attainment” (p. 33) seems plausible. The esoteric path is described below.

Finally, for purposes of comparison, the “salvation” offered by many elitist cults or “dualistic” (Anthony & Ecker, 1987) in-groups is most decidedly not enlightenment. ERep-M remains as prominent as ever, only the illusory belief that one is now a member of a spiritual elite has become a major component of one’s self-concept. The defense of projection is frequently favored. ERep-I remains as it was. EPro has not advanced and is typically not high. Rigid, dualistic thinking is incompatible with postformal levels. Indeed, flexible, relativistic thinking is characteristic of postformal thought and experience (Cook-Greuter, 1990; Commons et al., 1984). CN may or may not occur. What is problematic is that even if some measure of CN has been experienced—and most likely it is CN-lib or a conflated mixture of CN-lib and CN-pers, with a tinge of the transpersonal—the less than ideal ego functioning is likely to distort the meaning of the experience. Anthony et al. (1987) have amply documented the catastrophes that have often followed in the wake of what they call dualistic/charismatic groups, e.g., Jonestown.

4. Transpersonal/Meditative Paths

Although thus far the model has been applied assuming essentially static conditions, it can also describe change and development. Historically, there have been numerous transpersonal paths and techniques for attaining transpersonal states, including dozens of varieties of meditation and contemplation (Goleman, 1977), prayer, movement, and related attentional techniques (Ouspensky, 1949). Some of the major categories will be examined briefly in light of the proposed model; for the sake of comparison, a number of (personal level) psychotherapies will be briefly included.

It should be noted that most traditional meditative techniques were not taught in isolation, but as part of an entire cultural/historical tradition (Katz, 1978). Most mystical schools insist on a preparatory phase (a *via purgativa*) in which one’s personal life—thoughts, feelings, actions, moral decisions, and daily behaviors—is brought to a point at which the transpersonal training can truly begin. These preparatory techniques, which are maintained during meditative training as well, include the well-known

Table 1.3
Application of the Three-Factor Model to Transpersonal/Spiritual Paths

Path	ERep	EPro	CN
Kaballah	Preliminary requirements (age, marriage, exoteric mastery); <i>bitul hayesh</i> , purification prior to exploration of CN (stage of Awe)	Stage 4 minimally; enhanced through prayer, concentration, etc.; induction of *EPro*	CN-arch (stage of Love); later CN-spir (<i>devekuth</i>), or cleaving; CN* in some branches?
Vipassana (insight) meditation	Techniques of insight (*EPro*), deconstructs ERep in series of specifiable stages; two stages of preliminary and ascetic practices	Two stages to develop concentration, EPro, then two to develop insight *EPro*	Anaphatic theology says little of CN, except emptiness, Void, etc.; presumably CN-spir occurs as ERep is deconstructed
Concentration techniques: Yoga, Zen	Preliminary practices, moral purification, etc. Typical ERep preoccupations dispelled by concentration on mantra, koan, etc.	EPro enhanced, but insight not developed. Gradual or sudden (<i>satori</i>) emergence of *EPro*	CN-spir; CN-arch considered <i>makyo</i> , a subtle distraction
Gurdjieff (esoteric) traditions	ERep-M as illusory, but ERep-I remains. It must be transformed, harmonized. Permanent "I" as goal	Self-remembering to establish permanent "I"; disidentification from ERep-M; higher (esoteric) knowledge as goal	CN-lib rechanneled; CN-per/nat/arch enhanced; some traditions explore CN*; CN-spir possibly, but union is not primary goal*
Psychotherapy	Variable, ranging from modifying ERep-M alone, to integrating ERep with CN-lib/per, to reorganizing ERep around a higher Self (a positive symbol of CN-arch?)	Enhanced by techniques ranging from free association to body/mind integration to active imagination to disidentification to cognitive restructuring, etc. *EPro* unlikely	CN-lib derepressed; CN-per derepressed; in Jungian and other therapies, CN-arch becomes guiding focus; balance of personal and transpersonal; CN-spir very unlikely

Eightfold Path of Buddhism, the “abstentions and observances” (moral training) of Yoga, and the Kabbalistic requirement that the student, prior to initiation, has reached the age of forty, has met the ordinary challenges of daily life, including marriage, and has achieved mastery over the intellectual (exoteric) aspects of the tradition (P. Epstein, 1988). In terms of the model, one is first expected to “purify” ERep-M and to some extent ERep-I. A fairly high level of EPro (minimally stage 4 if not higher) is a prerequisite, and gaining control of one’s instinctual/emotional life (CN-lib) is insisted upon as well.

The Kabbalah then charts three stages of development. Before exploration of the transpersonal (CN-nat, -arch, -spir) was permitted, the student was required to develop a sense of humility or *bitul hayesh* (literally “ego annihilation”). In other words, ERep must first be reduced significantly through various inner and outer practices. This stage is called the stage of Awe (P. Epstein, 1988), since as egotism diminishes, even mildly transpersonal CN (CN-nat?) is likely to evoke awe. Then, “With his soul sufficiently cleansed by the ethical and spiritual practices centered on awe, the mystic . . . is prepared to reflect a vision of the Absolute” (p. 34). This is not yet true union with God, but an intermediate visionary/archetypal stage, the stage of Love (CN-arch).²⁰ The highest stage of *devekuth*, or “cleaving” to God, undoubtedly involves minimal (or no?) ERep, highly developed *EPro*, and the presence of CN-spir. Some branches of Kabbalism appear to have explored CN* as well.

Vipassana (insight) meditation has been shown (Brown, 1986) to follow a somewhat similar six-stage path: two preliminary stages involving ascetic and preliminary practices, two stages of concentration, and two of insight. This path involves a progressive deconstruction of the components of the static ego, including eventually the sense of “I-ness.”²¹ More precisely, the model suggests that EPro is strengthened by the meditation, facilitating *EPro*, with *EPro* being cultivated as the means to deconstruct ERep-M and ERep-I. It is crucial to remember that the synthesizing capacity of consciousness (part of EPro) is actually enhanced, as ERep vanishes (M. Epstein, 1988).

Interestingly, CN receives scant direct mention by Buddhist influenced writers like D. Brown (1986) and M. Epstein (1988), although the implicit hypothesis is that, as the veil of ego is dispelled, CN-spir is all that remains. The student is steered away from any aspects of CN-arch that may appear (Wilber, 1980). Unfortunately, the anaphatic or “negative” theology of Buddhism and various other traditions can superficially obscure the numinous aspect for those more familiar with positive (cataphatic) traditions (Dupre, 1987).

Purely concentrative types of meditation focus attention away from its usual fixation on ERep and its objects. ERep presumably diminishes and

EPro is definitely enhanced, although *EPro* is not cultivated. It deserves mention that many writers (Goleman, 1977) consider concentration techniques preliminary to the more advanced methods of insight (*EPro*). The Zen koan is a concentrative technique (De Martino, 1963) that works by presenting the student with a nonlogical problem that demands a solution. Existentially, the koan is an analogue of “the exact frustration and despair known by the ego [ERep] in its natural quest to fulfill itself” (De Martino, 1963, p. 161). As the meditator focuses intently on the nonrational koan (e.g., the sound of one hand clapping), EPro, as process, is enhanced dramatically; attention is shifted away from ERep as the koan consumes all the student’s energy. The hope is that there will occur a flip of consciousness (*satori*) to *EPro* and CN-spir, but apparently (Johnston, 1970) this can also lead to “Zen Madness,” a little advertised form of psychosis! Other techniques, like Transcendental Meditation, appear to use a synthesis of concentration and insight more or less in tandem (Campbell, 1976; Alexander, Chapter 2 in this volume). The more devotional traditions, such as the mysticism of “love” or “image” (Dupre, 1987) focus on various aspects of CN directly, although EPro is undoubtedly enhanced in the process, and attention and energy are likewise being withdrawn from ERep.

Washburn (1988) believes that prayer is actually a form of meditation and that it can take either concentrative or receptive (insightful) forms. While both Eastern meditation and prayer “access the unconscious in the same way” (p. 145), Washburn feels that the submissive attitude of prayer is better suited to his bipolar model of consciousness:

If it is true that the ego is inherently related to such a sovereign power [i.e., the Dynamic Ground], then it is fitting that the ego should meditate with an attitude of submission to this higher power—which is simply to say that the ego should meditate in the manner of prayer. (p. 145)

It is difficult to determine decisively, but ERep-I, very transformed via *EPro*, retains its presence in Washburn’s final integrated stage, except possibly in rare moments of mystical illumination (CN-spir). Here the ego, paradoxically, is strong enough to surrender to absorption by the Dynamic Ground. Mystical illumination, however, cannot be willed by the ego; it is a “gift of grace” (p. 232).

In contrast to mystical traditions whose ultimate goal, regardless of technique, is complete transcendence of ERep and the nondualistic union of CN-spir, other techniques and therapies have somewhat different ends. In esoteric schools, such as Anthroposophy or the Gurdjieff tradition, in visionary and shamanic paths, ERep is not entirely eliminated. ERep-M may be drastically modified or rendered illusory, but ERep-I seems to

remain or even be enhanced in an extraordinary manner. Gurdjieff's self-remembering technique was designed to establish a "permanent I," i.e., one capable of a degree of agency and continuity considerably beyond the normal. CN, especially CN-arch, is frequently cultivated in esoteric traditions, and often exploration of CN* is encouraged as well (Shepherd, 1954; Walsh 1989a, b). As noted above, the purposes of the esoteric traditions are to alter, not eliminate, one's sense of self and to seek knowledge of the higher realms rather than union per se. •

Most forms of psychotherapy have less exalted aims. In Coan's (1977) terms, inner harmony and relatedness take precedence over transcendence. Many forms of therapy have the more modest goal of modifying ERep-M, so as to decrease defenses and/or enhance self-esteem and/or achieve congruence of self-concept with organismic processes (CN-lib/pers perhaps). Reichian therapy, in particular, emphasizes integrating the ego with CN-lib/pers, and possibly even CN-nat at peak moments (Baker, 1980). Frequently, although the major focus is on body/emotional awareness, spontaneous changes in ERep will occur. The Reichian literature is replete with reports of dramatically altered sense of self (ERep-I), and with spontaneous changes in, for example, political beliefs (ERep-M) (Baker, 1980). Jungian therapy includes work on all levels of CN except perhaps CN-spir, taking a special interest in CN-arch (Jung, 1964). The desired goal of analytic therapy is the integration of the personality around the archetype of the Self. ERep-I is not eliminated—Jung was adamant about this point (Jung, 1964; Kalff, 1983)—but balanced both internally, e.g., in terms of extraverted and introverted orientations, and more importantly with regard to its subservience to the higher Self archetype. Despite some obvious points of divergence, Jung's view does actually converge with Buddhism:

Both attempt, each in their own way, to develop the notion of a relative ego, and both move away from a concept that sees it as an isolated, independent entity. . . . The Buddhists prefer a non-affirming negation of those aspects that are wrongly attributed to the mere "I." . . . By contrast Jung's approach concentrates more on the positive aspect of the negation of the ego. . . . Jung puts a positive symbol, namely the self, that emerges when the . . . wrong aspects of the ego have been given up. . . . Such an idea of the union of opposites excludes the notion of independent existence and emphasizes relativity and relationship. (Kalff, 1983, p. 122)

Psychosynthesis (Assagioli, 1965) somewhat similarly aims at a balance of personal and transpersonal integration, the lower self being guided by a gradually manifesting higher Self. The key technique (a form of *EPro*?) involves the process of disidentification from the stereotypical ideas, emotions, and habits that constitute much of the ego (ERep).

Conclusion

Not all of the controversies in transpersonal psychology have been resolved. Indeed, many were not even raised! However, this essay has attempted to accomplish two things: the careful analysis of a number of the more important areas of controversy, and, via the three-factor model, the clarification of precisely how and where different writers and schools disagree. Some claims that sound similar or identical turned out to be not so upon further scrutiny. Likewise, opposing views often turned out to have some underlying areas of convergence. It seems likely that arguments will continue to appear in print, but this is all to the good. While in its infancy transpersonal psychology required the posture of a united front, the field has now matured sufficiently to withstand the exposure of its many internal controversies.

Notes

1. More broadly, Walsh (1980) has summarized the characteristics of the ontology underlying transpersonal psychology and its related disciplines as "dynamic, fluid, impermanent, holistic, interconnected, interdependent, foundationless, self-consistent, empty, paradoxical, probabilistic, infinitely over-determined, and inextricably linked to the consciousness of the observer" (p. 225).
2. Coan (1977) takes a rather different approach altogether, accepting the legitimacy but not the unqualified supremacy of the transpersonal. Arguing for a multidimensional, as opposed to the more typically linear, unidimensional view of evolution and growth, Coan contends that transcendence is only one of many goals and not the sole index of development—relatedness, intrapsychic integration, creativity, and efficiency being other termini. In a sense, most transpersonalists, consciously or not, are endorsing a secularized version of "monotheism" (or at least a mono-teleology), while Coan holds out for a sort of "polytheism."
3. Somewhat along the same lines, philosopher of science Gerald Holton argues that one of Einstein's dominant themata was continuity, which "allowed" him to accept relativity, but not quantum theory, the latter being dependent on the opposing themata of discontinuity (Briggs, 1988).
4. Naranjo (1977) takes a similar view: "This is not to say that the spirituality attained through the pursuit of one path or the other is identical. . . . [W]e must also understand that the experience of the summit will differ in some respects according to the background of different climbers . . . for each has developed peculiar abilities during the long journey and will now receive the new impressions in a mind that has specialized in a certain way" (p. 87).
5. Assagioli (1965) takes a slightly different position, arguing that there are not really two independent selves, merely one Self which manifests differently depending on the level of self-realization. The lower self is thus a "reflection" (p. 20) of the higher.
6. Gowan's (1975) work, available for well over a decade, has been ignored by

most transpersonal psychologists. Originally, the author had intended to use Gowan's model in its entirety as the framework for this essay. Despite Gowan's originality and comprehensiveness, a number of theoretical problems arose which compelled instead a synthesis of several models. In addition to the vagueness about variability noted above, other problems include a likely misinterpretation (underestimation) of the ego level present in shamanism; a confusion over terms like "creativity," which appears at different classificatory levels in his schema; an overemphasis on the symbolic (if, by his own account, higher stages transcend symbolism, might we not need a "metataxic" stage beyond the syntactic?); and possibly a residual mind-body dualism implicit in his downgrading of the somatic realm. Furthermore, Gowan's use of the "jhanas" to represent the highest stages of consciousness does not jibe with Brown's (1986) and Goleman's (1977) accounts of the stages of meditation, in which the jhanas (products of concentration meditation) are treated as preparatory to stages of insight meditation and not as ultimate.

7. Of the many stage models of development available (Commons et al., 1984), Cook-Greuter's (1990; this volume) will be routinely relied upon here. It is both sensitive to the nuances of ego development and capable of embracing the transpersonal level, at least in a general way. Furthermore, it includes affective as well as cognitive aspects of development.

8. Washburn's concept of the Dynamic Ground bears strong similarities to Assagioli's (1965) view of the unconscious. The latter distinguishes between the lower unconscious (libidinal, dreamlike, etc.), the middle unconscious (elaborations of thought, imagination, etc.), and the higher unconscious or superconscious (philosophical, artistic, ethical, spiritual). He also posits a noumenal Higher Self, which is contacted in transpersonal states. We will attempt to tease out these aspects of Washburn's Ground below.

9. One other multifactorial map that has undoubtedly influenced the model presented here is that of Clark (1983), whose major components include mood and various facets of attention. No attempt is made to integrate the two models, although this may be possible.

10. On a deeper level one also defends one's affirming-subject, ERep-I. In fact, as has been made abundantly clear by various transpersonal writers (Washburn & Stark, 1979), ERep-I is inherently defensive in nature, being essentially a form of self-contraction. In this model, however, the more widely explored defenses of psychoanalysis will be treated as part of the ERep-M system.

11. Koestler (1964) observes: "[Structure and function] are two aspects of a unitary process, not two processes. In fact both terms . . . are abstractions derived from imaginary cross-sections along the spatial or temporal axis of indivisible spatio-temporal events. Structure is a static concept of a process frozen in the specious present" (p. 416).

12. This multipartite division of the ego may help clarify certain linguistic problems. Thus a faulty (incongruent, unrealistic) ERep-M can lead to a state called "egotistical," in which the ego as reflected content is defective (grandiose self-image). Attachment to ERep-I leads to a condition transpersonalists call "ego-identified," in which the ego as one's context of existence is overly narrow or contracted no matter how normal or well adjusted the person is by conventional standards. Undeveloped EPro leads to that quality of cognition Piaget called

“egocentric,” which denotes merely the failure of certain processes to develop, but which does not imply anything about the congruence of one’s self-concept, etc. Ego as content, context, and process (Vaughan, 1980) and their corresponding problems are often confused. Finally, a deficiency of *EPro* could be termed “uninsightful.” Similarly, Gurdjieff (Ouspensky, 1949) differentiated between one’s essence (a blend of EPro and other factors not included in the model, such as one’s genetic endowment, temperament, etc.), one’s personality (ERep-I), and one’s false ego (ERep-M). His technique of self-remembering undoubtedly enhanced *EPro*.

13. Keen (1983) aptly describes the integrated state: The moment the self arrives at the vision of unity of the cosmos, the eye (the I) that sees is dissolved into what is seen. At the top of the world we discover that it is an illusion to struggle to some point that is designated as the top of the world (p. 204). Rather, as Cook-Greuter’s (1990) multivector diagram reveals, “There is no single center where God dwells” (Keen, 1983, p. 204).

14. Undoubtedly one of the most difficult parameters of transpersonal psychology for the classically trained Western psychologist is the concept of “non-objective reality” (Grof, 1980), or what is here labeled CN*. Shamanic travels, NDE’s, and other visionary states frequently entail, so it is claimed, awareness outside our normal reality framework. Grof cites as examples spiritistic experiences (see Van Dusen, 1979) and encounters with suprahuman entities or deities (e.g., the Being of Light frequently reported as part of the NDE).

15. Goleman (1980) lists the “primary mental factors” that emerge with enlightenment, which include insight, mindfulness, modesty, confidence, non-attachment, impartiality, nonaversion, buoyancy, and efficiency. In extreme form, these qualities are most assuredly not those of the “conditioned” (De Martino, 1963) ego-consciousness (ERep prominent), but reflect “unconditioned” consciousness (ERep transcended).

16. It is precisely the reasonably adequate functioning of EPro that allows the paranoid schizophrenic, as opposed to the disorganized subtype, to maintain a well-organized delusional scheme. To the extent that EPro is weak, disorganization is likely.

17. Wilber (1986b) has thoroughly analyzed some dozen metapathologies that can occur as a result of transpersonal practice and experience. Inflation is offered only as an example. Others include pseudo-nirvana, i.e., mistaking archetypal illumination for final nondual enlightenment, and the “dark night of the soul,” a transpersonal depression occasioned by loss of CN after initial contact. Wilber emphasizes that this is distinct from psychotic, borderline, neurotic, and even existential depression.

18. Koplowitz (1984), for example, has shown how the concept of the permanent object, achieved during the sensorimotor period, becomes seen as a construct during the unitary stage of development.

19. There is an elaborate phenomenology of the substages of this process, too long for inclusion here. For example, the eighth of the ten oxherding pictures of Zen (Hixon, 1984) is entitled “Both Ox and Self Forgotten.” This is a profound state of emptiness, in which the ego is absorbed into CN-Spir, such that “Here there is no one, not even the sage” (p. 136). There are two succeeding pictures, however, in which this emptiness opens to fullness, eliminating the final duality between the

enlightened state of pure consciousness and mundane life. This last picture is called "Entering the Marketplace with Helping Hands" and depicts a "jolly rustic" (p. 137) who wanders through everyday life, full of love and compassion. From this perspective, everything inner and outer is observed to be a manifestation of CN-spir, even ERep.

20. P. Epstein (1988) describes in some detail many of the varied techniques used, which involve imagery, concentration (*kavanna*), ecstatic song (*niggun*), breathing exercises, etc.

21. Specifically, the sequence of ego deconstruction is as follows: everyday attitude is altered first, followed by thinking, gross perception, sense of self, time/space, and "extraordinary interactions," i.e., subtle CN-arch/spir that still falls short of true enlightenment. (See Brown, 1986.)

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